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"It is impossible not to see, in these feeble and sickly imaginations, that fatal temper of mind, which leads men to look for help and comfort from any source rather than from their own exertions." — Mr. WINDHAM's Speech on the Preliminaries of Peace.

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LETTER VI.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM Pitt,
ON THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF
GREAT BRITAIN.

DIGRESSION, 2.

Sketch of the present prospect of the
War.

SIR, — At a time, when every post from the continent is bringing fresh proofs of the triumphant progress of our enemy; at a time when the man, (a prayer for protection against whom makes part of the liturgy of our church,) is putting on the crown, having already taken possession of the dominions, of Charlemagne, while, by way of episode in the grand drama, he is keeping us plunged in all the expenses, the embarrassments, the uncertainties and anxieties of war; at such a time, it is natural that men should inquire, when and how, this state of things is to terminate. This question is, in fact, frequently asked; and, it is truly melancholy to observe, that the answer is seldom, or never, found expressive of confidence in our internal resource, our ability, or our resolution. We rarely hear any thing beyond a vague undefined hope, that all will turn out well at last, that we are not yet to be conquered, and that something or other will happen to frustrate the designs of the enemy. Those who are called upon for some foundation of their hope, refer us, 1. to the powers of the Continent; and, 2. to the discontents of the people of France, sometimes appearing to think, that it is not the interest of Bonaparte himself to conquer this country, nor to subvert its government.

It must be evident, that a fallacious hope can be productive of no good to the country, and that it may be productive of great mischief; therefore, it is well worth our while to consider, what degree of solidity there is in either of the foundations above-mentioned.

As far as we can speak from official documents, Russia appeared, at the close of her diplomatic intercourse with Napoleon, to be resolved, not on war, but, on a sort of hostile neutrality, a state, without doubt,

very unnatural, but one not altogether without a precedent in the history of Europe. The views of Russia, as they have been before described, appear to have been very steady; and her grand object, through every recent reign, has been, to urge on her influence towards the South. This object was, as the Russian politicians seem to have thought, considerably advanced by the part which that power took in the ever memorable German Indemnities. Prussia found her account in that distribution of territory and power; but Austria was cruelly injured and humiliated. Napoleon (I use his name to suit the purposes of perspicuity, always meaning, of course, to include the whole government of France); Napoleon took good care, however, that the Russian influence should not, by means of the German Indemnities, find its way permanently to the Southward; and, whether by the showing of great partiality to the princes connected by the ties of blood with the Imperial Russian family, or by the tone which the Russian plenipotentiaries were encouraged to take, the only effect which the new-modelling of the German Empire produced with regard to Russia, was, an addition to that jealousy, not to say envy and hatred, which was already entertained towards her by Austria; while, on the other side, the jealousy and the fears of Prussia could not have been diminished. That the ill-will of these two great German Powers should not have been greatly increased by seeing a Russian Plenipotentiary distributing the dominions of the Empire, new moulding and new-modelling its constitution, would, indeed, have been something for an age to wonder at. But, long before the affair of the German Indemnities, Napoleon had provided himself with the means of setting Russia at defiance upon any future occasion. Those means we now find amply treasured up in a secret convention, concluded between the two powers on the 11th of October, 1801, ten days after the date of the preliminaries of peace between England and France. On the 8th of the same month a treaty of peace was concluded between France and Russia; but, in this treaty, war is merely put an end to, and the ancient relationships of peace

are revived, without any mention of, or allusion to, other powers, except merely, that the Batavian Republic is included in the pacific stipulations. The important provisions, the adjustment of matter of dispute, were reserved for the secret convention, the substance of which convention we are now informed of through the mutual complaints of the parties relative to the non-fulfilment thereof. Napoleon, we are told, by the Russian notes, stipulated, 1. To evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and having so done, to engage to respect the neutrality of that kingdom, during the war then existing, and during all future wars; the latter of which stipulations he has certainly violated, and had violated at the time when the complaint was made by Russia, in the month of July, 1804. 2. He stipulated to establish, in concert with Russia, some principle whereon to come to a final settlement of the affairs of Italy; instead of which, complai's Russia, he did, almost immediately after the secret convention was concluded, cause himself to be chosen, and actually became, without any concert at all with Russia, President of the Italian Republic, and, at the same time, disposed of the other parts of Italy according to his sole pleasure. 3. He engaged to indemnify, without delay, the King of Sardinia, whom, however, he has not indemnified, but, on the contrary the chief part of whose territories he has annexed to France, and this, too, without consulting Russia. These charges are unquestionably well founded; but, Napoleon answers, * that Russia has not fulfilled her part, not only of the secret convention, but of the 3d article of the treaty of peace, which was concluded three days previous to the conclusion of the convention †. He charges Russia with having violated that article in giving protection to French emigrants; in accrediting them to the neighbouring powers of France, where they might indulge their hostile dispositions against their country; in authorizing the conduct of Count Marckoff, who, during his residence at Paris, encouraged intrigues to disturb the internal tranquillity of France, and who even went so far as to place under the protection of the law of nations, French emigrants and other agents in the pay of England; in ordering a court mourning for the Duke D'Enghien. He then demands, as a preliminary to any step in the way of fulfilment

* See Talleyrand's note of the 29th of July last, present Vol. p. 758 and concluded with the note on p. 759.

† See this treaty, Register, Vol. I. p. 165.

on his part, that Russia shall evacuate the Republic of the Seven Islands, agreeably to the 9th article of the secret convention, which stipulates that there shall be no foreign troops in those islands, an article, says he, evidently violated by Russia, who has continued to send troops thither, which she has openly re-inforced, and has changed the government of that country without the consent of France. He concludes, with declaring, that Russia has, besides, violated the 2d article of the secret convention, by manifesting a partiality for England, instead of co-operating with France, agreeably to the precise expressions of that article, "in order to consolidate a general peace, to re-establish a just balance in the four parts of the world, and to procure the liberty of the seas." D'Oubril, in his answer to this note of Talleyrand, treats the charges relative to the emigrants as vague and unfounded; he passes in silence over that relative to the mourning for the Duke D'Enghien; the taking possession of the Seven Islands he asserts was with the consent of France; but, as to the stipulated co-operation for "procuring the liberty of the seas," he says not a word. ‡—It was necessary, Sir, to take this short review of the grounds of the dispute between Russia and France, in order to be able to judge, not only of the present probable intentions of Russia, but also of the line of conduct which Austria and Prussia, more especially the former, is likely to pursue. Austria, already deeply stung by the triumphant rivalship of Russia, by the direct interference of the latter in the affairs of the Germanic Body, and by the losses in territory and in power experienced through the means of that interference, must have been fired with indignation and rage at learning the contents of the secret convention of the 11th of October, 1801. This feeling, on the part of Austria, Napoleon looked forward to as an inevitable consequence of a disclosure of the terms of the secret convention; and, therefore, he always laughed at the complaints and remonstrances of Russia; for, by breaking with her, on account of non-fulfilment of his secret stipulations, he was sure to have Austria on his side. That he never intended to fulfil any one of the articles of the secret convention is, I think, evident; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to determine, which would have been most detrimental to Europe, the fulfilment, or the non-fulfilment of them: the domination of Italy by Napoleon, or the introduction of Russia into the affairs of the South, which

‡ See his answer, present Volume, p. 759.

latter, to the extent contemplated by the secret convention, could not have failed to be speedily followed by the total overthrow of the Turkish Empire, and by the reduction of Austria to perfect insignificance; to say nothing about the "procuring of the liberty of 'the seas.'" The final adjustment of the affairs of Italy, if Russia had participated therein, must have led to some changes in the Mediterranean and on the side of Turkey. Russia would have had something more solid than a piece of parchment for the due execution of the terms of such adjustment. In short, the result most probably would have been, that from four great military powers, the number of those powers, upon the continent, would have soon been reduced to two: an Emperor of the East, and an Emperor of the West. Napoleon wanted no equal; he therefore chose to preserve Prussia and Austria and to break with Russia; thus making France the one and only first rate power, having three second rate powers whom he might play off against one another, according as his views might require, and as their interests and passions might favour those views.—His views, at present, as far as relates to the Continent, assuredly are, not to be at war with either of the great military powers; to prevent Russia from encroaching upon the Turkish dominions; to keep matters of territory, dominion, and military force, as they now stand; and, at all events, if Russia should, in any direction, pursue an hostile course, to arm Austria or Prussia, or both, against her. That he will not succeed in these views the state of things affords us little reason to hope. Russia may, in order thereby to obtain a greater degree of influence in the Mediterranean, join us in the war, to a certain extent. Her object is to gain influence to the South; and, having failed to accomplish that object by the means of a pacific co-operation with France, she may endeavour to accomplish it by the means of warlike co-operation with England; and, with this view, she may join us in the war. But, it is not very probable, that we should gain much by her co-operation. On the contrary, if it be of importance with us to have great influence in the Mediterranean and the Levant, the introducing of the Russian navy and influence into those parts appears to be the certain way of finally injuring our own interests; because, when we have once given her a firm footing, Napoleon will not fail to tempt her with a peace, in which our power, in that part of the world, should be sacrificed. Whether the temptation would succeed, or not, is a question the decision

of which must be left to those, who have observed the conduct of nations, under similar circumstances.—It seems, however, to be more probable, that Russia will not take any very active part in the war; because, without the co-operation of either Austria or Prussia, or both of them, she can make no impression upon Napoleon; and, for those powers to join Russia against him, in the present state of the Continent, would be to forge their own chains; seeing that the natural consequence would be, a peace, in which they would be sacrificed to Russia. Then would return the case to have been apprehended from the due execution of the secret convention of 1801; that is to say, the abasement of Austria and Prussia, particularly the former, and the division of Europe between two great powers, France and Russia. That this is the light, in which the subject is viewed at Vienna and Berlin we certainly have no positive proof; but, if it be the light wherein reason views it, we have no foundation to hope that they will view it in any other.—Before the recent acts of violence, committed by France, we talked about continental coalitions against Napoleon; and, since the commission of those acts, we have spoken with still greater confidence. But, we ought always to expect, that the powers of the Continent will act agreeably to their interests; that is, according to their own views of safety, or of ambition; and, when we come to look into the causes, which have created the quarrel between Russia and France, we find that the quarrel is for power, on the part of Russia, and that, such is the nature of that power, that the desiring to acquire it is, of all possible causes, the one most likely to create an irreconcileable enmity between that court and the other courts, with whom the wished-for coalition must take place, if it take place at all. As to the acts of violence, which Napoleon has ordered to be committed, particularly that committed upon our minister at Hamburg, they would, doubtless, in other times, have roused the powers of the Continent against the aggressor; but, now-a-days, such offences can only be expected to be brought forward in the list of provocations, when a power is already disposed and able to make war; and, when we express such sanguine hopes from this source, we seem to forget the treatment which Mr. Drake, Mr. Smith, and other of our ministers, have received from the courts of the Continent. The Elector of Bavaria ordered our minister away on account of the charge preferred against him by Napoleon; Lord Hawkesbury delivers to the foreign

corps diplomatic a note wherein he justifies conduct like that of which Mr. Drake was charged; whereupon Napoleon publishes an interdiction against all our ministers at neutral courts in the neighbourhood of France. As we are not permitted to doubt of the "prudence" of a doctrine promulgated by Lord Hawkesbury, we must content ourselves with the privilege of mourning its consequences. Perhaps, however, we may yet be allowed to express our surprize, that the government who openly justified conduct such as that of Mr. Drake, should never have openly obtained, or even demanded, any satisfaction for the deep disgrace inflicted in the driving of that gentleman from Munich.* Do we say, that the court of Munich was beneath the notice of a nation like England? the answer is, that it was not thought beneath the dignity of his Majesty to send a representative to that court. The Elector of Bavaria, through his minister, unequivocally expresses his abhorrence of the conduct of Mr. Drake, pronounces it to be inconsistent with the law of nations, and orders him, accordingly, not to appear again at his court. As far as we have heard, neither Prussia nor Austria have expressed any dissent from this decision of Bavaria: indeed, they seemed to assent to it, in the notes of their ministers, delivered upon the occasion, at Paris. What reason is there to suppose, then, that they will make any important movement in consequence of the seizure of Sir George Rumbold, which appears to have been grounded upon our having publicly proclaimed a doctrine the contrary of that upon which they then acted? To seize a public minister is, indeed, widely different from a request made to a neutral court to send him away; and, it is also widely

different from the seizing of the Duke d'Eglien; but, it is, nevertheless, not very likely, that those who remained entirely unmoved by the latter should be rouzed to war by the former. Our present inquiry is, not whether these courts act as become them; it is not what Austria and Prussia ought to do, but what they are likely to do; not what they think and how they feel as to our cause, but what part they are disposed to act during the war. And, I think, that man must be very sanguine, who expects them to arm for the purpose of avenging the seizure of our ministers at foreign courts.

—As, in this disgrace of our corps diplomatic, the cause seems to have, in a great degree at least, originated with ourselves; so, it would be by no means difficult to show, that the state of things which has so completely divided Austria and Prussia from Russia, as to feeling towards France, originated, in great part, from the same source. Our general conduct during the last war, and more especially our abandonment of our allies at the peace, have alienated the Continental powers from British connexion. Nay, that very secret convention, which has now proved so deadly an instrument in the hands of Napoleon, would never have existed, or would have been superceded, if we had acted a disinterested part in concluding the peace of Amiens; if we had not preferred the possession of colonies to the possession of influence upon the continent of Europe; if we had not preferred what we regarded as profit, to our honour. In the declaration of the present war, complaint is made, in His Majesty's name, that the French "have annexed to their dominions Piedmont, "Parma, Placentia, and the Island of Elba, "without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of "the most valuable part of his territory, "though they were bound by a solemn "engagement to the Emperor of Russia, "to attend to his interests, and to provide for his establishment."* To this the French have answered, "that, at the "peace, they offered to England, provided she would leave Ceylon to the "Dutch, to make such an arrangement in "behalf of the King of Sardinia as she "might propose."† This fact has been published all over the world, and not a word has ever appeared in contradiction to it. Whether true or false the world believes it; and upon that belief will judge of us and act towards us. And,

* Register, Vol. III. p. 744. † Ibid, p. 1924.

what a light are we placed in by this fact, when it is compared with our complaints made in behalf of the King of Sardinia at the breaking out of a new war between us and France? We complain, too, that, upon this subject, France has broken her promise to Russia. What, then, we knew of this secret convention, it seems, so long ago as the spring of 1803! But why did we leave the matter to Russia? Why did we leave in the hands of Napoleon this means of wheedling Russia into his power, the means of inflaming Austria against Russia, when we ourselves had wherewith to *purchase* for the King of Sardinia an establishment more ample than it was at all likely for Russia ever to obtain for him? Here, Sir, you must pardon me, if I recur, for a moment, to the debates upon the peace. "A great military monarch, when he was "at the lowest ebb of his fortunes," said Mr. Windham, "and had sustained a de- "feat, that seemed to extinguish all his "remaining hopes, the terms of his let- "ter written from the field of battle "were—"We have lost every thing, but "our honour." Would to God, that the "same consolation, in circumstances liable "to become in time not less disastrous, re- "mained to Great-Britain! I should feel a "far less painful load of depression upon "my mind, than weighs upon it at this "moment. But, I fear that we have con- "trived to combine in this proceeding, all "that is at once ruinous and disgraceful; "all that is calculated to undo us, in re- "putation as well as in fortune, to deprive "us of all those resources, which high "fame and unsullied character may create "even "under the ribs of death." Having next stated the case of Sardinia, and shown that it was our duty to make some sort of provision for her unfortunate monarch, he says: "We have left Sardinia, "however, without an attempt to relieve "her, without even a helping hand stretch- "ed out to support or to cheer her, under "that ruin which she has brought upon "herself, with no fault on her part, while "adhering faithfully to her treaty with us. — Naples, too, and Portugal and Tur- "key will arrest, to the end of time, the "good faith of Great-Britain; and shew to "the world, that *she* is not a power, who "seeks her own safety by abandoning those "with whom she has embarked in a com- "mon cause."* What would he have said, then, if he had known, that we might have obtained an establishment for the King

of Sardinia by the giving up of Ceylon! By the surrendering of a colony which has already cost us more, perhaps, in national strength than it is possible that it ever should restore to us! You, Sir, upon the occasion now reverted to, asserted, that we had acted towards our allies "with dignified "liberality." You were ready to grant, indeed, "that we ought to have claimed "Piedmont for its sovereign," but, said you, "could we have obtained it? Could we "have procured its restoration unless we "could have disposed of the King of Etruria, "unless we could have destroyed the Li- "gurian and Cisalpine Republics, and dri- "ven the French from the mountains of "Switzerland? Unless we could have "done all this, it would have been in vain "to restore the King of Sardinia to his "capital, surrounded as he would have "been by the French and by their depen- "dent and affiliated Republics." When we recollect that you were consulted in every stage of the negotiation, and when we also recollect the proposal made by the French respecting Ceylon and the King of Sardinia, we shall need no comment to enable us to form a just opinion of the motive by which this argument must have been dictated. But, Sir, if we could not obtain *Piedmont* for its sovereign, we now know that we could have obtained *something* for him by the yielding of Ceylon; and, the world well knows that we obtained him nothing. Mark, besides, mark well, for the world has marked, our frankness and sincerity. We could think of nothing less than *Piedmont*, and that too, quite independent; quite clear of all annoyance from any of Napoleon's republics; but, provided Russia will obtain an establishment for the King of Sardinia, we do not seem to care much what it is, or where or how it lies. It was "in vain," perfectly "in vain," for us even to re-place the King of Sardinia in "his capital," and, of course, in his do- "minions; but, if Russia will get him "an "establishment," we will thank her; nay, we will quarrel with Napoleon, we will even make it one of our grounds of war against him, if he refuses to grant this "establishment" through the means of Russia! How truly, then, was it observed by Mr. Wilberforce, that "the very in- "tegrity and good faith of the ministers "and people of this country rendered us "unfit for continental connexion!" — It may, perhaps, be said, however, that by utility in replacing the King of Sardinia

in his capital, you confined your meaning to utility to ourselves. But we now see, that such an act would not have been useless even to us. So true it is, that in acting justly by others, we, in the end, are sure to promote our own good. In the first place, we should have derived from such a proceeding the negative advantage of preventing the enemy from blasting our fame by the disclosure of the fact, that we refused to give up Ceylon for the purpose of obtaining a settlement for our unfortunate and faithful ally. We should have derived likewise the advantage always attendant on acts of national disinterestedness. Europe would have acknowledged that we had not been shedding her blood for our own sakes; and that though we were unable to leave our allies as we found them, we did all we could for that end. We should have preserved our character for generosity and frankness; we should not have lost all but our honour; we should, in that respect, have retained our honour and lost nothing; and, in the career of a new war, we should have started with, at least, the hearty good wishes of the Continent of Europe. But, besides this general effect of the proceeding, we should have prevented, or lessened, some of the particular evils, which we now experience. Any arrangement that we could have made for the King of Sardinia might have failed in preventing Piedmont from being finally annexed to France; yet, we are not sure that it would have failed. And, who shall be certain, that the abandonment of that prince by us was not the principal cause of that annexation? If the King of Sardinia had been re-established in Piedmont, however surrounded by French arms and French influence, the ejecting him would not have been a slight matter. It might have again brought Austria and Russia into the field. It might, and it would, have retarded the execution of Napoleon's projects. At any rate, it would have entirely prevented the secret convention between Russia and France, the terms of which seem to have been drawn up, for the express purpose of exciting the envy and hatred of Austria against Russia, after having kept Russia in the interests of France as long as her remaining so could be of any use to the latter. And thus, Sir, are we now smarting for that policy, which, looking at nothing but the custom-house books, preferred a spice-colony to the honour of the nation.—But, after all, some one will ask, is it possible that the powers of Europe, that Austria and Prussia will not renounce themselves, Rouze themselves, for what?

Against Napoleon? Why, he is the benefactor of the latter; and the former is a great power out of his reach, and in no danger from him, unless Russia be first let into the South. Swift tells a story somewhere about the curates and the bishops, the former crying out that the church was in danger, and the latter exhorting them to peace, observing, “we are very well as we are.” So say Austria and Prussia: and, if the heads of those nations were to read the London newspapers, they must be utterly astonished at our uneasiness on their account; at our friendly desire to promote their interests; at our philanthropic attention to their prosperity, safety, and independence; and, particularly at the tender anxiety we are constantly expressing for the preservation of their dignity and their honour. Sometimes this anxiety shows itself in our displeasure at their tame and pusillanimous conduct; and, there have been instances, where it has broken forth in reproaches, not to say downright abuse. Nay, we have not spared even menaces against them; and have, in a recent case, proceeded to put those menaces into execution, by seizing their treasure; as if we had said, ‘if you will not make use of ‘it for the maintenance of your honour, we ‘will.’—Yet, is it possible, that the powers of the continent, that Austria and Prussia, would stand by and see Great Britain subdued and added to the dominions of Napoleon, rather than embark in the present war against him? Such a choice certainly is not impossible. But, this is not the true question. The true question is: will Austria and Prussia, rather than engage in the present war, see Great Britain continue the war single handed, though exposed to the inroads of Napoleon, and even to the danger of being annexed to his empire? And this question, I am much afraid, that, upon a review of all the above-stated circumstances, we must determine in the affirmative.—Time to recruit is very much wanted by Austria; and both Austria and Prussia must wish to see the ambitious strides of Napoleon directed in any course rather than to the North and the East. That it will force its way in some direction or other they must well know; directed to the Westward, it is not very easy to discover how it could endanger or annoy them; and, therefore, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose, that they would even wish to see it exhaust its force upon these islands. In answer to such a supposition, it will be asked, whether Austria or Prussia could be safe, if the British dominions were once subdued by Napoleon? But, Sir, Austria and Prussia will easily see, that this sub-

jugation would not be the work of a few months, or of a few years; nor would it be at all astonishing, if they were to conclude, that the enterprize, though it might speedily destroy our constitution of government, and spread ruin and misery over the land, might cost more years than Napoleon has to live, and might eventually produce the restoration of the liberties of the continent.—For these reasons, Sir, it appears to me, that there exists no well-founded hope, that, in the course of this war, we shall derive any advantage from continental co-operation, unless we put ourselves in a situation to take a commanding part in a continental war, by providing such an army as shall at once convince those, whose alliance we desire, of the sincerity of our views and the solidity of our power.

From discontents in France we have, if possible, still less to hope. There was, indeed, a time when much might have been reasonably hoped for from that source; but, that time is past; the French royalists have seen a peace of Amiens, and they have read of the proposition for sending **GEORGES** and his gallant companions to Canada. The time was not, perhaps, entirely past, at the beginning of this war; but, things are now completely changed, and never again, during the present struggle, will there be found in France a single arm raised in a cause in which England is engaged.—Besides, Sir, for us to hope for discontents in France, we ought to be able to assign some reason why such discontents should now exist, or should hereafter arise. There is reason enough, indeed, in the circumstance of Napoleon's being an Usurper. But, this sort of reason never has had any weight against a famous military chief; and, we should recollect, too, that, though the collecting of the suffrages of the people might be a mere mockery, yet, the dynasty of **Buonaparté** has, in appearance at least, been established by the choice of the French nation. If we look at the privileged estates, the nobility and the clergy, we find that the old nobility are either destroyed, or incorporated with the new; that the clergy are a body as much of Napoleon's creation as is the legion of honour; and, that not only the interests, but the honour (or, call it the character, or reputation) and the very existence, of both, are inseparably interwoven with the new dynasty, or, in other words, with the **Usurpation**. But, the coronation of Napoleon, which has been a subject of so much mirth, real or affected, in the British metropolis, is a circumstance of a still higher order. Its influence will be felt by every Roman Catholic in the world; and,

we should not forget, that of the people of all Europe, these realms included, two-thirds, or thereabouts, are of the Roman Catholic religion. The London prints affect to regard the Pope as "a poor miserable old creature, dragged from his home, at this inclement season of the year, and at the evident risk of his life, to act a part in the impious farce of anointing the head and sanctifying the sword of a regicide and an apostate, previous to his being crowned with an Imperial Diadem." Poor miserable old creature, if they will have it so; regicide and apostate, as long as they please; but, Sir, the coronation, whatever be the actors, is no "*farce*;" on the contrary, it may, I fear, be justly regarded, as a sort of prelude to the most serious and most awful drama that ever yet was exhibited on the face of the earth. The former, and, for aught I know, the present, impiety of Napoleon, has been, and may be notorious; though the world will not fail to form a just opinion of the motives of the British ministerial prints, in preferring this charge against him now, when their praises of him during peace are remembered, and when it is recollected, that the British ministers, particularly your colleague Lord Hawkesbury, solemnly assured the Parliament that, at the peace, Napoleon had "publicly asked pardon of God and man." But, supposing the new Emperor still to be impious; and supposing his act of apostacy in Egypt to be a stain never to be washed out. Will this circumstance tend to lessen the effects of the Papal benediction? Does history tell us, that the apostacy of **Henry IV** rendered him an unpopular, or a feeble monarch? Or, do we read, that he was a most beloved and a most potent prince; and, though he perished at last by the hands of an assassin, his death is said to have occasioned more public grief than that of any king of France, **St. Louis** only excepted. To the editors of London newspapers the Pope may, both now and at all other times, appear as "a poor miserable old creature." But, we must not, without hesitation, conclude that he will, at any time, appear in that light to the Roman Catholics of any country. The present Pope is not only in fact, but in right, according to the Roman Catholic faith, the head of their church; and, I must confess myself completely at a loss to discover how either his person or his office has been "humiliated and degraded" by his being called in to confirm a title, and to give his sanction to an authority, conferred by a nation consisting of thirty-five millions of people, or, assumed by the most powerful sovereign, or chief, in the world.

With affected contempt and commiseration, Buonaparté has been blamed for "reviving" "the *superstitions fooleries* of Charlemagne." The comparison is most unfortunate. Charlemagne was the first Emperor of the West; he was a great and glorious warrior; he defended the Pope against the arms of his oppressors; he was crowned by Pope Leo III; his character was most noble; all his views were grand; he reigned long, with great glory to himself and with not less happiness to his people. Is such the man, whose "fooleries" Buonaparté is to be *laughed at* for reviving? But, suppose, merely for argument's sake, the anointing by the hands of the Pope to be, in our opinion and in reality, a "superstitious foolery." How does that lessen the value of the ceremony to Buonaparté, and how does it diminish its influence in Europe, if the Roman Catholics do not consider it as a "superstitious foolery," but, on the contrary, as a very important religious act, conferring honour and sanctity upon him who receives it? Why, it may be answered, that the Roman Catholics are, then, superstitious fools. This leaves us where it found us; for, their being superstitious fools, if true, will not deprive them of existence; will not make them fewer in number than two-thirds of the inhabitants of Europe; will not rob them of those faculties, which render their approbation valuable to him, on whom it is bestowed. It is very easy to cry "superstition and foolery." The writer above quoted had only to open one of the books of Calvin, and he might instantly have collected together terms and epithets, wherewith to make, against the Roman Catholics, as dirty a diatribe as his heart could have yearned for. But, whatever other sins the Roman Catholics may have to answer for, *lukewarmness* is not generally one. It is of the very essence of the Roman Catholic church to inspire her sons with great zeal; great public spirit, as far at least as she is concerned; great devotion to her interest; great jealousy for her honour. And, if they, at all times, possess these feelings, in what an uncommon degree must they possess them at this time; when, after a long series of persecutions and of degradation, they see her again raising her head? Think you, Sir, that they have not felt the despitful treatment of their church? That they were unmoved spectators of the exultation of the saints, of both Old and New England, and every where else, at the time when the French armies were riving "Anti-Christ" and the Whore of Babylon? Think you, that they have forgotten this? Verily they have not; and, if they do not now exult in their victory, at seeing the conqueror of so

many countries, he who disposes of kingdoms, bowing at the altar of their church, submitting to her laws, and receiving his crown at the hands of their pontiff; if they do not exult at this, they must have much less zeal than they have usually possessed, or much more magnanimity than was ever professed by any other class of mankind. Exultation at the effect will naturally be followed by some degree of praise of, if not of gratitude towards, the cause. What! praise of an apostate! There is the mistake: we regard him as an apostate, they as a convert. As a son that was lost, and that is found. And, as to his being a hypocrite, so much the greater the triumph of Christianity in general, and of the Church of Rome in particular; for his obeisance to the Pope, considered in conjunction with his hypocrisy, is a complete proof that temporal authority is not to be maintained without spiritual aid; and thus atheism and deism, after all their scoffing, are compelled to assume the garb of piety, and to bend their proud necks at the shrine of the Gospel. The Roman Catholics in foreign countries will be, however, still disposed to participate in the feelings of their rulers towards Napoleon, as far as temporal matters are concerned; that is to say, if they are justly treated by those rulers, and love them accordingly. But, even they, remembering that he has exalted their church, and taken her under his mighty protection, will not hastily wish to see his power subverted; and, as to France, every religious sentiment there will assuredly operate to the consolidation of his throne. Such, Sir, appears to me, to be the natural consequences of an event, which, since it was first spoken of, has been a constant subject of mirth amongst those sprightly gentlemen, who, to the honour of our country, conduct the ministerial news-paper press of the metropolis.—But, 'the despotism, the sev-

* A burlesque representation of the coronation of Buonaparté was the brilliant conception of a rich loan-maker. It was to take place at a masquerade of his giving; the dresses, scenery, and dramatis personæ are said to have been all provided; but, from some cause or other, just before the night of exhibition, Balaam's heart failed him, and the conception was left to descend to, and be improved on by, the news papers and the mob. Accordingly, we were soon afterwards told, that the *MAJOR OF GARRAT* (a well known burlesque upon elections and members of Parliament) was about to be raised to the rank of Emperor; and, it was stated in the news-papers, that *SIR HARRY DINSDALE*, a muffin-seller,

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city of Napoleon's government: will not the people of France thereby be roused? In answer to this, I cannot, in the first place, help observing; that, if we deny, that a despotic government is the only government suited to the character of Frenchmen, and that, repeating the sentiment of Voltaire, "good or bad they must have a master;" if we deny this, I cannot help observing, that I and all those who have entertained and expressed the same opinions with myself, flatly contradict our former assertions; and it must be fresh in every one's memory, that when, during the peace of Amiens, Bonaparte assumed the consulship for life, the ministerial writers expressed their joy on the occasion, regarding a despotic government, in the hands of a single person, as the only means of preserving tranquillity in France,

who was called Mayor of Garrat, had been before certain police magistrates, and asked them if there was any legal objection to his taking the title of Emperor, and being crowned accordingly, whereupon he was, it was stated, told by the magistrates, that there was certainly no impediment to the assumption. The account of the intended coronation shall be given in their own words.

—“PROCLAMATION. To our dutiful and loving subjects of Garrat. “We, the Imperial Court of Garrat, do hereby give notice to our beloved Subjects, that Our August Emperor, Sir Harry Dimsdale, will be crowned, at his Imperial Palace, the King's Head, in Old Compton-street, Soho, on Monday the 15th day of October, in the year of our Lord 1804, at the hour of eight o'clock in the evening. Given at Our Court, in Compton-street, this 12th day of October, 1804.—God save the Emperor!—The curiosity of the public was so great to see this mock coronation, that it was hardly possible at eight o'clock, the hour appointed, to find even standing room in the place where the Emperor was intended to be crowned. The Emperor, (who is a very little and deformed man, who used to hawk muffins about the streets) delivered three or four speeches full of professions of patriotism, and attention to the interests of the people, in a strain of caricature of the declarations which are too frequently made in exalted situations with as little sincerity as Sir Harry's. His Majesty made a bungle in the delivery of one of his speeches, which was very excusable, as he did not read them according to the usual form, but repeated them from memory. Some discontent was visible in the countenances of many, and some even dared to

and of “healing the wounds of Europe.” These were their very words. Yet, now we are seeking, in this very sort of government, for the infallible means of disturbing the tranquillity of France, and for again opening “the wounds of Europe!” It is curious to observe how men's opinions change with their situations. How anxious they seem to find out the means of hiding their dangers and disgrace even from themselves!—In the next place, Sir, I should like to know, whence it is that these writers now conclude, that the severity of the government of France will produce discontents amongst the people of that country, while these same writers are daily contending, that, by similar means, a contrary effect has been produced in Ireland. Suffer me to quote, for instance, the Morning Post news-paper of the 13th inst.:

“openly express their disappointment and dissatisfaction at having paid their half-pence and not seeing a crown furnished. Most fortunately there came in a party of volunteers, who offered themselves to constitute his body-guard, and immediately arranged themselves on his right and left for the defence of his royal person. Good order was attempted to be restored, by a motion that the coronation should be postponed to the 9th of November, the day fixed for another coronation, when it was hoped that his Holiness the Pope might be prevailed on to assist in the performance of this important ceremony. The mobility, however, had come to see a coronation, and a coronation of some sort they would have. A crown bowl of punch was thought to come nearest in rank and sound of its title to the imperial crown. It was placed upon his royal head by his body-guard, and ‘God save the King’ was sung in full chorus. Several huzzas and shouts of ‘Long live the Emperor’ proclaimed that he was legally invested with the dignity.”—The volunteers coming to form his body-guard was quite in character. But, was the satire really aimed at Bonaparte? How could the anthem of “God save great George our King,” sung in burlesque, be meant as a satire on the emperor of France? I think one may perceive through the whole scene, and the description of it, something that it is by no means wise for magistrates to encourage, and that may, if only a little improved upon, tend to the producing of events far from laughable. In short, we may by such means, degrade ourselves, our country, and our government; but never shall we thereby whitewash one hair of Napoleon's head, or blunt that point of one of his half million of bayonets.

" With respect to the report of the sailing of the French fleet, we are confident that no such intelligence has been received either in England or in Ireland, nor do we believe that there is the slightest foundation for the statement; and as to the rumour of approaching disturbances, we have the happiness to hear, that in the best informed and official circles, no apprehensions whatever are entertained in this respect. The reports which have for some time past been circulated respecting the state of Ireland, we are now well assured, were, for the most part, erroneous. *No symptoms of discontent have of late been manifested in that country;* the accounts relative to the escape of state prisoners in different parts of the country are wholly unfounded, nor have there been for some time past, any persons of that description in confinement, except at Kilmainham, and a very small number at Cork and Belfast. On the whole, the great body of the people of Ireland are at present attached, *in a remarkable degree,* to the government, and the country in general is in a *far more tranquil and promising state than it has been for many years past.* That there are some disaffected men in Ireland, the dupes of wicked and designing outcasts, our information does not warrant us to deny; but we have the consolation to know, that a very great proportion of the people are actuated by the most sincere and ardent sentiments of loyalty; and that should the enemy ever succeed in reaching the shores of that country, they will find hundreds of thousands ready to repel the aggression, and to turn the attempt to the utter destruction of the aggressors." Now, Sir, I by no means insinuate, that the government of Ireland, though the habeas corpus act is suspended and though the people are liable to martial law, is as severe as the government of Buonaparté. My argument does not require that fact to be established. But, I boldly presume to suppose that it will be granted, that the government of Ireland is somewhat more severe than it was before the habeas corpus act was suspended and before the people were made liable to be tried and adjudged by martial law; if this be granted, and if it be true that the people of Ireland are now " attached to their government in a *remarkable degree,*" and that the " country in general is in a *far more tranquil and promising state than it has been for many years past,*" the people being " actuated by the most sincere and ardent sentiments of loyalty;" if these two positions are advanced, or admitted, I should be glad to hear the argument

whereon these writers ground their hope of discontents against Napoleon, arising from the severity of his government.—This argument, however, drawn from the experience of Ireland, is, it must be confessed, worth nothing, the radical position being shamefully false; and, I have only introduced it in order to shew how completely destitute these writers are of principles whereon to reason.—A much better argument, against the opinion that Napoleon's government will be disturbed by domestic discontents, presents itself in the general, and, indeed, the natural effect of such governments; and one may safely aver, that the sovereign who has a body of enterprising nobility, whatever be their denomination; a national church, to which ninety-nine hundredths of the people are attached; a numerous, well-disciplined, and well-appointed, army: one may safely aver, that he who has all these at his command, need be under little apprehension from the discontents of the people. "The enemies of *tyranny*" (said the Oracle newspaper of the 19th ultimo;) "the enemies of *tyranny and oppression* will be glad to hear, that the French nation itself, doomed for some time past to vent its complaints in unavailing murmurs, has at last courage to remonstrate aloud against the usurpation of *Buonaparté*, whose pride and insolence are intolerable. Talleyrand and Fouche, who may be called his right and left arms, perhaps his very vital principle, have indicated symptoms of dislike, to the will of the tyrant. The armies are also beginning to express sentiments of disaffection. Accounts from Boulogne state, that *universal discontent prevails among the troops;* that all idea of their embarking for the purpose of invasion has been abandoned; and that the flotilla men are ready to turn against their commanders." Thus, Sir, are the people of this country deceived; thus are duped; thus are their spirits buoyed upon by false hopes, by a reliance upon any thing rather than their own national exertions! Napoleon, supposing the force of his authority alone to be insufficient for the purpose of repressing domestic disturbances, has, in the ruling passion of Frenchmen, and in his inclination and ability to gratify that passion, I mean the love of national glory, means more than quite sufficient to secure, not only the tranquillity of the state, but the hearts of the people. It is not against a renowned military chief that a people rebels; it is not against such a chief that a people murmurs: no, Sir, they murmur and they rebel against rulers of an exactly opposite description. Such a chief may be

tyrannical; but from this cause the great mass of the people will feel not much inconvenience. "To men remote from power" his tyranny will hardly be known; while the glory which his military achievements shed upon the country, will illumine even the meanest hut, and will endear him to every one to whom nature has not denied the capacity of feeling that he has a share in that glory: and, of those who do not so feel, the enmity may be safely despised. Besides, the soft, the silent, the cat like paw of corruption and of perverted law; the exercise of tyranny under the name, and in the phrases, of justice and liberty, such as I have witnessed in America, for instance, is much more deleterious to society, as well as more grating to the soul of the individual, than the random bolts, the partial blows, of a single despot, which, at least, leave to the sufferer the consolation of being pitied. But, suppose the choice to lie solely between the loss of individual liberty and the loss of the glory of the country, shockingly degraded must be that people who would, for a moment, hesitate to prefer the former. The aversion to upstarts, I grant, is powerful and highly laudable: it has its rise in the more just and noble sentiments of the mind. But, Sir, those who have risen, however suddenly, by deeds of arms, are not upstarts. The term upstart will never be applied to the hero of the Nile. Extraordinary talents, exerted in rendering great public services, whether in the cabinet or the field, are a fair foundation for rank and power. Men exalted by such means may be an object of envy amongst their less meritorious or less fortunate rivals, but the mass of the people will seldom fail to acknowledge the justice of their claims. The upstarts whom good men hate are such as have risen by low and base arts, or who have grown up out of the follies or vices of their particular patrons, or of the government and governing system in general. They have been well denominated mushrooms; for they spring from the rotten part of the state, and the soil that bears them will seldom bear any thing else. Crawling sycophants, labourers in the dirty work of corruption, with all the endless list of jobbers of every description, such as I have seen in America, for instance. Such are the upstarts; men who, having, as it were, stolen fortunes from the public treasure; that is to say from the labour of the people, become, by the means of those fortunes, the possessors of the land, making slaves of those whom they have already pillaged and impoverished: such are the upstarts, whom every honest and honourable man must hate, and to whose sway he can

never submit without impatience. To the arrogance of military chiefs people have an apology for yielding; but, quietly to yield to the inglorious tyranny of tame peculators admits of no excuse. The tyranny of military chiefs is harsh; but it is not humiliating. It does not debase the mind, as well as empty the purse, of the sufferer. Hence it is that we have seen the French submit to almost any thing from their military rulers, while the people whom they have subdued, though they wanted the courage to resist their own cowardly masters, seized the first opportunity for shaking off their authority; as if they had said, 'if we must be slaves, let us submit to those whose power and whose military fame will afford an excuse for our submission.' This, Sir, is a sentiment of a most dangerous tendency, and one which, I trust, the people of this country never will be tempted to adopt. But, at the same time, I cannot but think it full as likely that they should adopt such a sentiment, as that the people of France should now become generally discontented with the government of Napoleon.

Such, Sir, are my reasons for thinking, that, in the prosecution of the present war, there exists no well-founded hope, that we shall, pursuing our present policy, derive any aid from alliances on the Continent, or from discontent amongst the people of France. I beg to be understood, not as having described what *ought* to be the conduct of the continental powers, or of the people of France; but what *will* be their conduct: and, the motive by which I am actuated, is, to convince you, that, tremendous as the conflict will become, we have no reliance but upon our own exertions. What is the prospect of the war, with regard to those exertions, shall be the subject of another letter.—In the mean while, I remain, Sir, your, &c. WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Dec. 13, 1804.

VOLUNTEERS.

Under the head of **SUMMARY OF POLITICS**, I had much to say; but the foregoing subject appeared to me more important than any other at this time. An occurrence relative to the Volunteers must not, however, be omitted. It will be found very emphatically described in the following advertisement from the **SUN** newspaper of the 8th instant.— "Whereas it has been represented to the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, that a most violent outrage was on the night of the 9th day of October last committed at Marazion, in the County of Cornwall, on Lieut. Andrew Wells, and a party of seamen and marines belonging to his Majesty's ship **Gannett** (who had been

“ sent on shore for the purpose of apprehending two deserters), by a number of men, “ in the whole about thirty, armed with musquets and bayonets, dressed in regiments, and supposed to belong to the 2d battalion of Mount’s Bay Volunteers, who “ attacked the lieut. and his party, and compelled them to retreat to their boat, and “ while in the act of launching the same, in “ order to get on board their ship, feloniously fired several musquets loaded, at them, “ the balls from which passed very near the persons of the said lieut. and his party:— “ Whoever shall apprehend, or shall give such information to Messrs. George and Samuel John, of Penzance, solicitors, as shall be the means of apprehending any of the persons concerned in so firing off the said musquets at the said lieut. and his party, or of giving any orders or directions for the same (other than and except the persons who actually fired), so that such offenders, or any of them, may be brought to justice, shall receive a reward of fifty guineas, to be paid on their conviction, by Mr. Bicknell, Solicitor of the Admiralty, Spring garden Terrace, London.”

STATE OF IRELAND.—LETTER V.
(See the foregoing letters, p. p. 673, 711, 745, 906.)

SIR,—There remain two points of view in which the question of Catholic emancipation should be considered, in order that the subject should be fully before your readers. FIRST, the possible effect of it on the security of property in Ireland; and, SECOND, the effect of it, as it relates to the connexion of that country, taken in the sense of a distant country, and Great Britain. The first I propose to make the subject of this letter.—It has always been held by the violent asserters of Protestant ascendancy, that the property which was forfeited at different times in Ireland, and granted or sold by the crown, to Protestants, would be restored to the right heirs, if ever the Catholics were permitted to sit in Parliament. It is not here necessary to analyse the motives of such insinuations: we shall merely confine ourselves to the mode of reasoning, and the facts on which this has been advanced.—It is stated, in proof of this position, that maps are carefully preserved of the forfeited lands, by the descendants of those families from whom they were taken, and that regular conveyances are made thereof, by wills and other legal instruments; and further, that the Irish House of Commons, in the reign of James the Second, repealed the act of settlement, which act confirms the Protestant titles, that the same act would again be re-

pealed if Parliament were opened to the admission of the Catholics.—In refutation of the first part of this argument, we shall deem it sufficient to state, that many of the forfeitures took place in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; those in the province of Ulster in that of James the First; and the remainder in the interval between that reign and the reign of Queen Anne. The latest, therefore, of these forfeitures occurred above 100 years ago, and many of them so long ago as two centuries.—When these facts are added to the consideration of the method of preventing the growth of popery in Ireland, which has been acted upon during the first eighty years of the last century, the exterminating system of warfare with which the Irish rebellions have been opposed, and the extreme difficulty which must have attended the perpetuating of the titles to these forfeited lands during such long periods of time, even from father to son, and the infinite confusion that must arise from any attempt to give back these forfeitures, in all cases where the lineal descent could not be traced out, the impracticability of the restoration of them is very easily made out. But the circumstance, which of all others has contributed to strengthen the titles of the Protestants, is the very first act of concession which the Catholics experienced; namely, the permission to purchase, and to take land on lease in the same manner as the Protestants. This privilege was granted in 1778, and, since that period, the riches of individual Catholics, and the quantity of lands purchased by them, and taken under lease, is so extensive, that they are themselves a body very much interested in the security of the titles under which the Protestants first acquired the forfeited lands. In reply to the argument that is deduced from the conduct of the Irish House of Commons, in the reign of James the Second, it is only necessary to observe, that the recurrence of such a measure is absolutely impossible. There exists no Irish Parliament in which a King of these realms could pack a Catholic majority; but, on the other hand, there exists those laws, and that coronation oath which prohibit the adoption of measures similar to those acted upon by James in Ireland; and, in the place of a Parliament of Ireland, there is a Parliament of the Empire, in which it has already been shewn that no such conjuncture can take place, as the uncontroled sway of the Catholic body in matters either of spiritual or temporal concern. In confirmation of what is here maintained, we have the opinions of the most violent advocates of Protestant ascendancy, the late Lord Clare and Dr. Dugan, expressed by them as the grounds of

their association. The union was in such a state of the power of even individual as an autocratic union, a The union had been of the Irish express a gion, as the of settlers in Ireland ment.— impracticable be more consider which, the Catholic forfeited a no lessing about the a the con the secu even if with Gr the title have to lic purch the Cat interests the act in the only co but ind confusio experie mine th the hazar subject bility estates, can effe shadow trivial a the me success vided a rations particula late year acquiri peny, to the

their assent to the measure of a legislative union. This latter protector of the Catholic penal code, declared in Parliament that the union would secure the right of Protestants in such a manner, as to preclude the possibility of their being assailed by the attacks of the Catholics; and so forcible was the power of this Doctor's reasoning, that it even induced Mr. Addington to quote him as an authority to prove the benefits of the union, as it related to religious controversy. The union, in fact, as it has, in a former letter been stated, is the charter of these rights of the Irish Protestant. It secures, by an express article, the Protestant reformed religion, as the established religion of the country; and it precludes the repeal of the act of settlement, by placing the legislature of Ireland in the hands of an Imperial Parliament.—What is here stated respecting the impracticability of the repeal of this law, will be more fully exemplified by taking into consideration the manner and means, by which, under the existing circumstances, the Catholics could recover the possession of the forfeited lands. They would, in truth, have a no less work to perform than that of bringing about a rebellion, so successful as to expel the authority of Great Britain; for, without such an event they could not dissolve the connexion with Great Britain, which is the security of the titles of Protestants; and, even if they could dissolve the connexion with Great Britain, which is the security of the titles of Protestants, they would then have to acquire the consent of all the Catholic purchasers of landed property, and of all the Catholic tenants, many of whom have interests in their farms greater than those of the actual owners, to such a total revolution in the state of property, which would not only contribute directly to their own ruin, but indirectly to a system of anarchy and confusion greater than the world ever before experienced. Whether, therefore, we examine this argument, which goes to prove the hazard of granting a complete emancipation to the Catholics, as it bears upon the subject of security of property, as to the probability of their attempting to regain their estates, or, as to the means by which they can effect it, there remains not the slightest shadow of sound reason to authorize the most trivial apprehension. Time has worn away the memory of the advantage of enjoying it, successive penal laws have progressively divided and impoverished the successive generations of claimants, and those laws, more particularly the law of union, which have of late years been made concerning the right of acquiring, and the means of preserving property, have placed the restoration of the for-

feited lands far indeed beyond the reach of human attainment, to those who by descent or grant may have a virtual title. Whatever circumstance may have been omitted to be noticed in this attempt to silence the clamours of those, who can bend to seek inviolable and weak arguments, to prejudice the cause of the Irish Catholics, will be sufficiently excused by the anxiety which necessarily arises to produce that species of disproof, which alone is in itself adequate to the purpose; namely, the voluntary declaration of the whole Catholic body, as quoted in a former letter, (p. 715) "We do hereby solemnly disclaim, and for ever renounce all interest in, and title to, all forfeited lands, resulting from any right, or supposed rights, of our ancestors, or any claim, title, or interest therein; nor do we admit any title as foundation of right, which is not established and acknowledged by the laws of the realm, as they now stand." (Declaration of the Irish Catholics.) Here we have before us the condition, on which the Catholics require their rights; and this condition wisely, voluntarily, and unanimously offered, in anticipation of silly apprehensions, and for the permanent satisfaction of every one whom the active promulgation of these fears might have warped in judgment. Such conduct, surely, should not only quiet all alarms respecting property, but also produce a reciprocal anxiety on the part of the Protestants to remove erroneous impressions, and to promote the great work of universal conciliation. The Catholics, by their mode of proceeding, have displayed their wisdom and their liberality, and the Protestants ought not to permit it to be said, that they have evinced, in return, any thing that can be termed intolerance and folly.—Having discussed, in detail, the nature of the question of security of Irish property, we shall now consider it in a more general point of view, as connected with the Catholic claims. If there is any truth in either one of two common opinions, first, that the rebellions in Ireland originate in the discontents of the Catholics; or, secondly, that a act of concession will prevent the recurrence of them, the security of property will be further strengthened by the emancipation. While the point is contended, whether the measure will or will not lead to future imaginary evils, the existence of rebellion is a present evil, and much more deserving of attention. No man can deny, that internal tranquillity will add to the security and value of property, nor can it well be imagined, that, in a country where three-fourths of the inhabitants are excluded from their constitutional rights, their exclusion does not operate as a standing and

powerful source of every description of tumult, from the frenzy of a mob to that of the violence of an organized rebellion. What is it that renders the market price of lands in Ireland only 20 years purchase, while in Great Britain it is 30 years? What is it that renders Ireland a preferable object of French invasion, and inferior in point of natural defence to Great Britain? What is it that drives away the gentry, and that checks the improvement of land, and the civilization of the people? It is the privation which three millions of people experience of their franchises. It is because they do not enjoy the benefits of *Magna Charta*; and, therefore, cannot be stimulated to exertion in defence of the British connexion, by the same bond of union and fraternity which rouses the people of Great Britain to exertion against every attempt to invade their liberties. Instead, therefore, of the security of property being hazarded by the emancipation, it cannot be said to exist until this measure is adopted; and those short sighted politicians, who refuse it, under apprehensions of future danger, deceive themselves by the darkness of their understandings. If a proprietor of land requires to know what is wanting to raise the value of his estate to 30 years purchase, he must be told, it is the emancipation of the Catholics. If the expelled country gentleman wishes to know what measure will enable him to return in safety to his mansion, his sports, and his society, he must be informed, that this measure is Catholic emancipation. If the Protestants seek a remedy against the miserable state of living in constant fear of becoming the objects of the cruelty and the barbarism of their Catholic fellow subjects and neighbours, it must be explained to them, that this remedy is Catholic emancipation; and, if the minister of Great Britain knows what will best promote his fame, and will adopt that measure which will most certainly preserve the integrity of the British empire, against the hostile attempts of all enemies foreign and domestic, he will adopt the measure of Catholic emancipation. — *Z. — Liverpool, Nov. 25, 1804.*

REFUSAL OF BANK NOTES.

SIR.—I have perused the letter of your correspondent *Agricola*, Vol. VI. No. 16, p. 580, with attention, and quite agree with him in his legal observations. I approve also of the remedy he proposes, though, I do not think, that in times like the present, a measure which requires so general a display of energy and decision, will be carried into effect. In order, however, to make it as little difficult as the nature of circumstances

will permit, I shall be very glad of your correspondent's opinion upon the following cases. FIRST: Suppose I refuse to receive money tendered to me in Bank notes, and bring an action for the debt; the defendant pays the whole sum into court, which I am desirous to take out in order to be allowed my costs. In what manner shall I proceed, so as to obtain payment of both debt and costs in specie? If in this case, I proceed to trial, no costs will be allowed me, because the money paid into court is the whole of my demand, unless the court should think that the debt not being paid into court in specie, was a sufficient reason for proceeding to trial. — SECOND: Suppose no money is paid into court, and I obtain judgment either after inquiry or verdict, and issue execution against the goods of the defendant which I sell. Shall I be justified in selling them at a lower price than they are really worth, (which undoubtedly, I should be obliged to do) in order to obtain payment of my demand in specie? It is true, that I am at liberty to take the person of the defendant, but very often that sort of remedy would be worse than the disease; for I should not only lose the debt and costs, but be obliged to pay the sheriff's poundage, and other expenses to a considerable amount. — I put these questions to your correspondent, because I trust he will be able to answer them in a satisfactory manner; and, because, in all events, I wish them to be answerable. It is not, however, my desire to see your publication made the mere vehicle of practical law; but these questions are so very material to the point in agitation, that I make no apology for troubling you with them. The paper-system has now become so general, and its influence is so alarmingly perceptible, that every means should be adopted in order to keep it within reasonable bounds. Formerly, the list of persons, who arose to sudden affluence, was almost solely filled with contractors and jobbers, that harpy tribe which delights to wallow in the blood of armies, and to feed and fatten upon the vitals of mankind. Of them it has been observed, that their palaces rose like exhalations, and their equipages glittered like meteors; but now this sort of *hocus pocus* work has become so common, that it neither excites our indignation nor surprise. The system of paper-money has so set at nought the once usual and progressive rise to opulence and power, that the man, who yesterday stood behind our chair, shall to day rival and excel in magnificence, splendor, and personal influence the Howards, the Percys, and the Russells; those hereditary repositories of the glory and the renown of the kingdom. Whe-

ther these things are symptomatic of the greatness, or decline, of a nation, he who has observed the course of recent events with attention, will be able to form a conclusion at once correct and sorrowful.—I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. Crito.

MILITARY OFFICERS' PAY.

SIR,—A paragraph having lately appeared in all the daily papers, confidently stating, that a board of general officers had been ordered to assemble, on the subject of increase of pay to the officers of the army; and that the several rates had been actually fixed. You may easily conceive what sensations of joy such intelligence created throughout every rank of the profession, from the ensign to the lieut.-colonel; the lower ranks indulging the fond hopes of being soon rescued from the constant prospect that stood before them of imprisonment, and the want of the common necessities of life; and the field officers, that they might be placed a little above their present situation of mere existence.—The chagrin and deep disappointment that has succeeded the development of so cruel a fiction, can be very well imagined, and must make every well-wisher to his country regret, that that profession which you, Sir, so justly think, in the present political state of Europe, (but particularly of Great Britain), ought to be elevated over every other class of men in the public opinion, should have remained so long and meanly remunerated, as to be absolutely despised by common tradesmen for their abject state of poverty!—Is this a situation, Sir, for the officers of the army to be permitted to remain in, at a period when every thing that is dear to Britons is likely to depend upon the gallant exertions of the regular force.—In the year 1797, the pay of the private soldiers was not only doubled, but they have had, ever since, the very great additional benefit of being supplied with their provisions of animal food and bread, at the low fixed price of sixpence and three half pence per pound, should those articles ever have risen to ten times that sum; so that, in fact, the private soldiers pay has become more than three-fold within six years, when that of the officers has remained *in statu quo* for upwards of sixty, with the exception of one poor shilling per day to the subalterns; what might have caused this sudden effort of unbounded attention and comfort to the soldier, without extending any part to the officers, I shall not attempt to offer an opinion on; but, it is a stubborn fact, that a common mechanic enjoys a greater degree of pecuniary independence than the subalterns, or even captains of the army, and, that an officer, when at last arrived at

the rank of major or lieut.-colonel, after long and, perhaps, severe service, has ingrely sufficient to keep the external appearance of poverty from his door, without possessing enough to furnish him with ordinary enjoyments within the reach of his grocer or taylor. Their circumstances have been still farther circumscribed, in proportion to their rank, by the force of an indirect order, which has, for these two or three last years, obliged the field officers to be constantly mounted, and of course put to the expense of keeping, at least, one if not two horses, without any allowance whatever to cover this enormous expense; this reduces a field officer's pay considerably below that of a captain. This hardship has been more severely felt since the period that the field officers companies were taken from them, by which they not only lost a considerable contingency, but likewise, the field allowances which were attached to companies; which altogether has decreased the field officer's emolument at least sixty pounds per annum; and unfortunately, just at the time that he was made to pay five per cent income tax. By giving this letter a place in your Register, you will very much oblige an old friend to the army in general, with three sons at present in the profession.

A. B.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

PAPAL ALLOCUTION.—*Allocution delivered by his Holiness the Pope to a Secret Consistory addressed on the 29th of October, 1804, previously to his departure from Rome on his journey to France, in order to assist in the Coronation of the Emperor Napoleon.*

(Continued and concluded from p. 892.)

A request of this nature not only in itself affords the clearest proof of his religion and filial reverence to his Holy See, but it has been also accompanied with express declarations, by which the Emperor has informed us of his constant desire to promote the holy faith, to repair the injuries for the preventing of which he has laboured with so much zeal in these flourishing regions.—You therefore see, most venerable brothers, what just and momentous causes we have for undertaking this journey; we are moved not only by the interests of our holy religion, but by gratitude to that powerful Emperor, who has put forth all his authority to cause the Catholic religion to be freely professed: publicly exercised in France; and who has shewn his mind so anxious for increasing the prosperity of that religion.—We have also formed great hope, that having undertaken this journey by his invitation, when we shall speak to him face to face, such things may be effected by his wisdom for the good of the

Catholic Church, which is the only ark of salvation, that we may be able to congratulate ourselves on having perfected the work of our most holy religion. It is not so much on our weak eloquence that we build that hope, as on the grace of him whose unworthy vicegerent we are upon earth, whose grace, when invoked by holy rites, is poured largely into the hearts of princes, who are rightly disposed for receiving the good effects of a sacred ceremony, especially when they are the fathers of their people, solicitous about their eternal salvation, and determined to live and die true sons of the Catholic Church.—For these causes, venerable brethren, following the example of some of our predecessors, who have, for a certain time, left their own abode to visit distant regions to promote the interests of religion, and to gratify those princes who have deserved well of the Church, we undertake the present journey, although the distance, the unfavourable season of the year, our advanced age, and the infirm state of our health, would have otherwise completely deterred us from such a voyage. But we esteem these considerations as nothing, if God will but grant us the prayers of our heart.—Nor have those things which should be before our eyes, at all escaped our mind before we formed our serious resolution; but we have seen and considered every thing: in which consideration many difficulties arose, and our conscience was on some of them doubtful and uncertain; but such answers have been returned, and such declarations made by order of the Emperor, that we have been persuaded of the utility of our journey for the good of religion, which is an object. But it is unnecessary to detail in a diffuse harangue, these causes to you, to whom I have already communicated them, and whose opinions (before we undertook a step of such moment) we not only consulted, but to whom, as it was right, we gave the greatest weight.—Not to pass over, however, that which is above all things necessary in important deliberations, well knowing that (according to the saying of Divine Wisdom) the resolutions of mortals are weak and timid, and their foresight doubtful, even of those men who excel most in morals and in piety, and whose speeches rise like incense to the presence of God; we have, therefore, taken care to put up the most earnest prayers to the Father of all Light, that directed by him, we may do that only which is pleasing in his eyes, and which may end in the prosperity and increase of his church.—God is our witness, before whom we have in all humi-

lity poured forth our heart, to whom we have often raised our hands in his Holy Temple, beseeching him to listen to our prayer and help us, that we have proposed to ourselves nothing else than what ought always to be our object; his glory, the interests of the Catholic religion, the salvation of souls, and the discharge of those apostolic functions which have been entrusted to us, unworthy as we are. You also are our witnesses, venerable brethren, to whom, as we assisted at your councils, we wished that every thing should be perfectly known and understood, and to whom we have fully communicated the genuine feelings of our heart. Therefore, when so great an object is likely by divine assistance to be completed, acting as a faithful vicegerent of God our Saviour, we have undertaken that journey, to which we have been prompted by such strong reasons. The Father of all Mercies, will, as we hope, bless our footsteps, and shine on this new epoch of religion, with the fulness of increased glory.—After the example of our predecessors, and particularly the recent example of Pope Pius VI. of revered memory, who made the same resolution when he set out for Véodosme, we inform you, venerable brethren, that we have disposed and ordered every thing, so as that the curse, and the hearing of causes with assistance from this holy seat, shall remain in their present state, until we shall have returned, and, as we have considered in our minds that the necessity of death is imposed upon all, and that the day of our death is uncertain, we have therefore thought it necessary to follow the example of our predecessors, particularly of Pope Pius VI. when he set out for Véodosme, by ordering the pontifical *comitia* to be held, if God shall please to take us away from this world, during our absence from you.—Lastly, we beg and intreat of you always to retain for me the affection you have hitherto shewn for me, and that in our absence you will command our soul to the all-powerful God, to our Lord Jesus Christ, to his most glorious Virgin Mother, and to the blessed Apostle Peter, that this journey of ours may be fortunate and prosperous, and that it may end happily. Which if we shall, as we hope, be able to obtain from the author of all good, you, venerable brethren, whom we have always called to share with us in our councils, and in all that concerns us, must have a great share in the common joy, and we shall exult and rejoice in the mercy of the Lord.